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Elizabeth L. Anderson, J.D. Candidate 2010

Rejecting the Second Circuit’s Wagoner rule and agreeing with the First, Third, Fifth,
and Eleventh Circuits, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
collusion of corporate insiders with third parties to injure the corporation does not deprive the
corporation’s trustee of standing to sue third parties, resulting in a greater rift between Second
Circuit and the other Courts of Appeal on this issue. Moratzka v. Morris, 482 F.3d 997, 1004
(8th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, the court affirmed that such a situation may give rise to the
defense of in pari delicto barring the trustee’s action. Id.
In Moratzka, the plaintiff-trustee brought suit against a third party-defendant alleging that
it committed malpractice, aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by the Chief Manager of
the debtor corporation, and assisted the Chief Manager in looting the assets of the debtor
corporation. Id. at 999. The Bankruptcy Court first dismissed the plaintiff-trustee’s complaint
on the grounds that the trustee alleged only an injury to the creditors, not an injury to the
corporation.1 The court then denied a motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that doing so
would be futile because the defense of in pari delicto would bar the complaint anyway. Id. On
appeal the district court affirmed on different theory, finding that the trustee lacked standing to
bring such a claim, because it belonged to the creditors of the debtor corporation. Id. at 1000.
The Eight Circuit disagreed with the holdings of both lower courts. Id. at 1007.
Throughout its analysis, the court stated that there were two distinct issues that had to be
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addressed: the issue of standing and the issue of defenses, and that the lower courts failed to deal
with these issues correctly. Id. at 1004. The court then concluded that the plaintiff-trustee was
the proper party to bring the claims against the third party-defendant for malpractice, and for
aiding and abetting the Chief Manager’s breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 1006. As to the issue of
in pari delicto, the court held that it did not have to determine the merits of the defense, because
defendants had not asserted it. Id. at 1005.
Although the decision of the Eight Circuit affirms the idea that trustee standing and the
in pari delicto defense are two issues that should be dealt with separately, the implications of the
case may be less substantial than expected. Although the circuits disagreed about whether issues
of standing and in pari delicto should be separated, the Eight Circuit affirms the rule that in pari
delicto may be asserted as a defense against a plaintiff-trustee defeating his recovery. Id. at
1005. The following discussion focuses on two issues: first it will examine why the
constitutional issue of standing requires a separate and distinct analysis from affirmative
defenses, like in pari delicto; and second the article will examine the impact of the Eight
Circuit’s decision.

The Circuit Majority
Prior to the Eight Circuit’s holding in Moratzka, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits held that plaintiff-trustee’s standing to bring a case involved a separate
analysis from whether third-party defendants can assert the defense of in pari delicto. In Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R. F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3rd Cir. 2001), the
Third Circuit struck down the lower court’s analysis, which treated in pari delicto as a standing
issue. Instead the court held “[a]n analysis of standing does not include an analysis of equitable
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defenses, such as in pari delicto. Whether a party has standing to bring a claim and whether a
party's claim is barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions, to be addressed on
their own terms.” 2 Id. By adopting the view of its sister circuit courts of appeal, the Eight
Circuit has further chipped away at the idea that an in pari delicto defense deprives a trustee of
standing. See Moratzka, 482 F.3d at 1004. However, since its decision in Wagoner, the Second
Circuit has prevented a consensus between the circuit courts by holding these are not issues that
should be addressed separately.

The Wagoner Rule
The Second Circuit, in Wagoner, analyzed defense of in pari delicto as presenting a
constitutional standing problem, and held that a claim against a third party for defrauding a
corporation with the cooperation of management does not accrue to the trustee. 944 F.3d at 118120. In Wagoner, Herbert M. Kirchner (“Kirchner”) formed HMK Management Corporation
(“HKM”) and was the sole controller of the daily operations. Id. at 116. HKM began opening
accounts at Shearson Lehman Hutton (“Shearson”) and closely worked with them in executing
trades. Id. Moreover, Shearson taught Kirchner how to minimize losses. Id. After Kirchner
acted in violation of state law and was forced to close HKM accounts, HKM filed for
bankruptcy. Id. at 117. The plaintiff-trustee for HKM then brought a claim against Shearson
alleging that it had breach its fiduciary duty to the corporation. Id. at 117.
After reviewing the facts set forth above, the court determined that the trustee failed to
have standing to bring the second claim because “a claim against a third party for defrauding a
corporation with the cooperation of management accrues to the creditors, not to the guilty
corporation.” Id. at 120. Although the court did not use the term in pari delicto the court’s
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holding suggested that when the defense exists, a trustee is barred from bringing his claim on the
basis of standing, instead of the merits. Id. The decision on the Second Circuit, in Wagoner, has
been criticized by other Courts of Appeals as well as academics as confusing an in pari delicto
defense with the “case or controversy” standing requirement. Moratzka, 482 F.3d at 1003.
In the cases that followed Wagoner, the Second Circuit seemingly moved away from
strict adherence to its holding, as two different exceptions to the rule have emerged: “(i) where
the officers of the corporation or agents acted with an adverse interest to the corporation,
abandoning the interests of the company; and (ii) where there was an ‘innocent decision-maker’
within the debtor corporation that could have prevented the misconduct of the officers and
directors.” Dennis J. Connolly and Bess M. Parrish, Current Issues Involving The Application
Of Exculpation And The Business Judgment Rule To Creditors' Suits Against Directors Of
Insolvent Corporations, 2006 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW Part I § 1. When any of these
exceptions are met a plaintiff-trustee will have standing. Id. However, despite these exceptions,
the Second Circuit remains out-of-step with the other circuit courts by failing to treat trustee
standing and in pari delicto as separate issues.

Ending the Circuit Split
The Eight Circuit’s opinion in Moratzka not only creates a distinct majority that standing
and in pari delicto are separate issues, but it also directly takes on the Second Circuit’s decision
in Wagoner, revealing why it is a misapplication of the law. Id. at 1002-03. In Moratzka, Chief
Manager Murray Klane was one of two owners of Senior Cottages of America (“Senior
Cottages”) and owned a 60% interest in the company. Id. at 999. In 1998, Senior Cottages
became insolvent, and as a result needed to sell its valuable assets. Id. at 1000. However, rather
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than finding an arms-length buyer, Klane created a new company, Millennium Properties, LCC
(“Millennium”), and transferred all the assets of Senior Cottages to Millennium. Id. In return,
Millennium assumed the debts of Senior Cottages, but paid nothing for the assets it received,
which the complaint valued at $4.8 million. Id.
The firm Morris Carlson, Hoelscher, P.A. (“Morris”) was outside counsel for Senior
Cottages and also represented Klane. Id. It advised Senior Cottages to transfer the assets and
assisted in the transaction. Id. As a result, the Senior Cottages trustee alleged that the Morris
knew that the transfer of was inadequate consideration and that Klane was breaching his
fiduciary duty to Senior Cottages by making the transfer. Id. In his suit, the trustee claimed
Morris committed malpractice, aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty by Klane, and
assisted Klane in looting Senior Cottages’ assets. Id. at 999.
Unlike Second Circuit in Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1991), this court emphasized that standing and the defense of in pari delicto were two
issues, not one in the same and therefore should be addressed separately. Moratzka, 483 F.3d at
1004. In examining the standing issue, the court stated the constitutional requirement of standing
is satisfied if the plaintiff alleges “an injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct,
and the requested relief must be likely to redress the alleged injury.” Id. at 1004 (quoting
Novartis Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 190 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1999)). In addition to the
constitutional requirements of standing, the trustee must also be within the scope of the
Bankruptcy Code. Moratzka, 483 F.3d at 1004. The Bankruptcy Code only empowers a trustee
to bring causes of action belonging to the debtor corporation. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1). This rule
prevents a trustee from asserting a claim belonging to the creditor, and when the trustee attempts
to do so he will be denied standing before the bankruptcy court. Moratzka, 483 F.3d at 1004.
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While section 704(1) limits the types of claims a trustee can bring, a trustee does have
authority to bring an action for damages on behalf of the debtor corporation when it is an action
the debtor himself could have brought. Id. at 1002. For example, where third parties have
breached a fiduciary duty to the corporation, the trustee may bring a claim against that thirdparty, because this right originally belonged to the debtor. Id. In Moratzka, the trustee alleged
that the actions of Morris aided Klane’s breach of fiduciary duty causing Senior Cottages to
suffered an injury. Moreover, Klane, the debtor, could have brought this claim against Morris,
giving the trustee standing under the Bankruptcy Code. Moratzka, 483 F.3d at 1004.
Furthermore, the injury was traceable to the actions of the defendant and could be redressed by
damages, fulfilling the other requirements of standing. Id. The court agreed and determined that
the plaintiff-trustee had standing to bring suit against the third-party defendants. Id. at 1005.
Moving to the issue of defenses, the court stated the availability of the defense in pari
delicto, does not automatically end the plaintiff’s ability to bring the claim. Id. at 1004. Instead,
it is a defense on the merits requiring the facts and circumstances surrounding the case to be
examined. Id. 1004-05. Therefore, even if an in pari delicto defense appears on the face of the
complaint, it does not deprive the trustee of constitutional standing, even though the defense may
eventually be fatal to the claim. Id. at 1004. In the case at hand, the third-party defendant’s did
not assert the defense of in pari delicto, and therefore the court did not have to address whether
the defense was meritorious based on the facts before them. Id. at 1005.
Keeping in step with the other circuits, the decision of the Eight Circuit in Moratzka has
further chipped away at the authority of Wagoner. Moreover, this decision has aided in the
creation a majority rule among the Federal Courts of Appeal that the defense of in pari delicto

Cite as: Defense of In Pari Delicto Does Not Affect Trustee Standing, 1 ST. JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR.
No. 1, at 6 (2009), http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl/volume/v1/anderson.stj
(follow “View Full PDF”).

Anderson - 7

does not deprives a trustee of standing. While this decision was important in helping to bring a
consensus on the law, the overall implications of the case may be less substantial than expected.

Does it Really Matter?
Although the circuit courts have disagreed about whether issues of standing and in pari
delicto should be separated, their treatment of the defense in pari delicto in bankruptcy cases
always produces the same result: the defense bars the trustee’s claim. In Moratzka, Eight Circuit
continued to follow this pattern by finding that in pari delicto can be asserted as a defense
against a trustee, defeating the trustee’s recovery. 482 F.3d at 1005. The next section of the
article will first explore the doctrine of in pari delicto in bankruptcy law and how a majority the
circuit courts have used in pari delicto to preclude a trustee from pursuing charges against
defendants. Finally, the last portion will explore the arguments used to make the defense
inapplicable to a plaintiff-trustee in bankruptcy law.
In pari delicto is an equitable defense that can bar a plaintiff-trustee from recovering on
his claim. 9 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., 3d. § 174.36 (revised Jan. 2009). The doctrine
provides that where two parties are involved in wrongdoing, one party cannot recover from the
other damages suffered as a result of the wrongdoing. Id. The defense is based on the principle
that a party should not profit from its own misconduct. Id. Although in most situations the
doctrine prevents the court from aiding a plaintiff who bases his cause of action upon his own
immoral or illegal acts, Terleckly v. Hurd, 133 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1997)(citations omitted),
in the bankruptcy context the courts have employed the doctrine to unjustly allow third-party
defendants, who contributed to the demise of the debtor corporation, to escape liability. Jeffery
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Davis, Ending the Nonsense: The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Has Nothing To Do With What is
§ 541 Property of the Bankruptcy Law, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 522 (2005).
This seeming misapplication of justice occurs for two main reasons: first when a trustee
is assigned to represent a bankruptcy estate, he steps into the shoes of the debtor and takes no
greater rights than the debtor had himself. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R. F.
Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3rd Cir. 2001); and second, the language 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(1) states the “estate is comprised of …all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case.” Using these reasons, a majority of the courts
have held that when the plaintiff-trustee steps into the shoes of the debtor, a defense good against
the debtor is also good against the plaintiff-trustee. Id. For example in Sender v. Buchanan, 84
F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff-trustee asserted that his claim against a third-party
defendant for fraud should not be barred by the defense of in pari delicto. However, Tenth
Circuit disagreed, stating that of language section 541(a)(1) established that the estates rights
were no greater than they were when actually held by the debtor. Id. at 1285. Moreover, the
court looked to Congressional intent of the trustee’s role in the bankruptcy proceeding and found
that the trustee was to stand in the shoes of the debtor and take no greater rights. Id. As a result,
the court concluded that the plaintiff-trustee could not use his status as a trustee to insulate the
corporation from the wrongdoing of the debtor. Id.
Similarly, in Grassmueck v. American Shorthorn Ass'n, 402 F.3d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir.
2005) the Eight Circuit held the defense of in pari delicto can bar a claim by a bankruptcy trustee
against a third-party defendant. The court stated that in pari delicto could be used by a thirdparty defendant against a plaintiff-trustee, if the defense could have been raised against the
debtor. Id. The court then went onto conclude that given the debtor’s involvement in the
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fraudulent actions along with the third-party defendants, the plaintiff-trustee was barred from
pursuing his claim.3 Id. at 841.
The Second Circuit has joined the Tenth, Eight, and Sixth Circuits in analyzing the
application of in pari delicto. Although the Second Circuit’s application of in pari delicto has
been treated as a constitutional standing issue, see supra, 6 at ¶ 3, the result reached by the court
in the application of the doctrine has been the same: the trustee is barred from bringing his claim.
See Wagoner, 944 F.3d at 120. In Wagoner, the Court stated: “[a] claim against a third party for
defrauding a corporation with the cooperation of management accrues to the creditors, not to the
guilty corporation.” Id. Although the court does not mention the defense of in pari delicto its
rational for barring the claims in clearly based on the same principles of the doctrine.

Injustice of In Pari Delicto
While a majority of the circuits have concluded that in pari delicto can bar a trustee’s
action against a third party, the injustice that often results has been recognized by the courts. See
Terlecky, 133 F.3d at 380; Sender, 84 F.3d at 1285. The application of in pari delicto in the
bankruptcy context seems unjust for two main reasons. First, it goes against public policy to
allow third parties participating in immoral or illegal action to escape civil liability. Terlecky,
133 F.3d at 380. Second, the application of the doctrine punishes innocent investors, represented
by the trustee, who have been injured by the immoral or illegal behavior of the debtor and third
parties. Sender, 84 F.3d at 1285.
The Circuits have been given the opportunity to remedy this injustice, but so far have
chosen not to do so. In Sender, the plaintiff-trustee claimed that as a bankruptcy trustee he was
immune from any defenses based on the debtor’s wrongdoing. He argued that as a trustee he
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was attempting to rectify the fraud perpetrated by the debtor, thus making the misrepresentations
attributable to the debtor no longer legally relevant. Id. The plaintiff-trustee bolstered this
argument by pointing the court to the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Scholes v. Lehmann, 56 F.3d
750, 754–55 (7th Cir. 1995).
In Scholes, the defendants attempted to assert the defense of in pari delicto against an
appointed receiver for the corporation. Id. at 754. The court rejected the defense reasoning that
the purpose of in pari delicto is to prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from his own bad acts
by recovering damages. Id. However, when a receiver was appointed in the case the wrongdoer
was removed from the scene, and therefore could no longer profit from his wrong doings. Id.
As a result, the court held that the defense of in pari delicto could not be asserted against the
plaintiff-receiver. Id. at 754–55. Using parallel reasoning, the plaintiff-trustee in Sender stated
that with his appointment as trustee, the debtor and his wrongful action was removed from the
scene, and therefore the defense of in pari delicto could not be asserted against him. 84 F.3d at
1285.
While the Tenth Circuit recognized the appeal of the applying of the holding in Scholes
to the case before them, it rejected its application given the language of section 541(a)(1) and the
role of the trustee in the eyes of Congress. Id. The court went so far as to say that the
Bankruptcy Code expressly prohibited the result sought by the trustee. Id. However, by
focusing only the language of section 541(a)(1), the court failed to consider the purpose of in
pari delicto.
In in pari delicto when the one of the wrongdoing parties is completely removed from the
action the requirements of the defense have not been satisfied, and therefore it falls away. 9
NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC., 3d. § 174.36 (revised Jan. 2009). In the bankruptcy context
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this is exactly what has occurred, the wrongdoing debtor has completely been removed from the
situation by the appointment of a trustee, and therefore the defense of in pari delicto should fall
away. In Sender, the court could have arguably exclude the defense of in pari delitco based on
the requirements the defense alone. However, this argument is weakened by Congress’s intent
that the trustee step into the shoes of the debtor and take no greater right than the debtor had at
the time of filing for bankruptcy. Sender, 84 F.3d at 1285. In preventing the defendants from
asserting the defense of in pari delicto against the trustee when they could have done so against
the debtor, the trustee is acquiring rights the debtor never had. Id.
The Circuit Courts have set the precedent that the defense of in pari delicto can be
asserted against a trustee, if the defense could have been asserted against the debtor. See Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditor, 267 F.3d at 360; Sender, 84 F.3d at 1285. Although some circuit
courts have recognized that this can led to unjust results and that an exception may be necessary,
such exception cannot be found in the Bankruptcy Code. Sender, 84 F.3d at 1286. As a result,
the injustice of these situations will continue to persist.

Conclusion
The decision of the Eight Circuit in Moratzka, 482 F.3d 997, 1004, affirms that trustee
standing and in pari delicto are two issues that should be dealt with separately, seemingly
solidifying the law on this issue. However, as seen, the implications of the case may be less
substantial than expected, because whether the court addresses in pari delicto during a standing
analysis or as a separate issue the circuit courts have reached the same result: the plaintiff-trustee
is barred from bringing his claims against a third-party defendant guilty of wrongdoing. The
injustices resulting from this application of the law will continue until the legislature takes
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action, because although the courts recognizing the public policy for having such an exception
they are unwilling to create one.

1

The trustee only has standing to bring claims that are the property of the estate and therefore a trustee cannot bring
a claim on behalf of the creditors of a debtor corporation. Moratzka v. Morris, 482 F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2007).
2
Accord Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Edwards, 437 F.3d 1145. 1149–50 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
although the trustee had standing to bring the case, the defense of in pari delicto ended the trustee’s claim); Baena v.
KPMG, LLP, 453 F.3d 1, 4–7 (1st Cir. 2006) (addressing the issue of standing and defense of in pari delicto
independently); Schertz-Cibolo-Universal City Indep. School Dist. v. Wright, 25 F.3d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating the ability of the defendant to assert a defense against the debtor does not preclude the debtor from brining
the claim).
3
Accord Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditor, 267 F.3d at 360 (agreeing with Tenth Circuit’s finding in pari
delitco barred the trustee’s action against third parties when employing section 541).
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